We investigate the emergence of classicality and objectivity in arbitrary physical theories. First we provide an explicit example of a theory where there are no objective states. Then we characterize classical states of generic theories, and show how classical physics emerges through a decoherence process, which always exists in causal theories as long as there are classical states. We apply these results to the study of the emergence of objectivity, here recast as a multiplayer game. In particular, we prove that the so-called Spectrum Broadcast Structure characterizes all objective states in every causal theory, in the very same way as it does in quantum mechanics. This shows that the structure of objective states is valid across an extremely broad range of physical theories. Finally we show that, unlike objectivity, the emergence of local classical theories is not generic among physical theories, but it becomes possible if a theory satisfies two axioms that rule out holistic behavior in composite systems.
Introduction In Science, even the simplest phenomena can unveil unexpected details about our most fundamental theories of Nature. For instance, the plain observation that the night sky is dark allows far-reaching conclusions to be drawn about the large-scale structure of the universe [1] . Another seemingly innocent situation is when two or more children play with colorful marbles. The set-up itself involves some properties of macroscopic physics: when they look at some of the features of the marbles, such as color, or size, they agree about their observations, and when they look again, they can confirm the marbles have remained the same. This agreement means that macroscopic physics is objective. Note that this is a general feature of classical physics: there exist systems with properties such that different observers can measure them, agree about their results, and at the same time leave the state of the system undisturbed. This contrasts with quantum theory, where states are generally disturbed by the act of observation, and sometimes an agreement between observers is impossible [2, 3] . Nevertheless, in quantum mechanics there are objective states, in the sense that various observers can determine them without disturbance [4] . It is argued that such objective states may indeed be responsible for the objectivity we experience in our everyday life [4, 5] . In quantum mechanics, the theory of decoherence first [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , and later quantum Darwinism [4, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] and the presence of the so-called spectrum broadcast states (SBS) [5, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] have been proposed as explanations for the emergence of classicality and objectivity out of the quantum world.
In this letter for the first time we extend the study of the emergence of objectivity beyond quantum theory, to arbitrary physical theories [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . This is particularly important for a twofold reason. First, this will enable us to identify which part of quantum mechanics is actually responsible for objectivity at the most basic level, by looking at it "from the outside", in a landscape of conceivable alternative physical theories. At the same time this analysis can be used as a test of physical consistency of post-quantum theories aiming to accomplish a quantum description of gravity [36] [37] [38] , for every extension of quantum theory must still be able to account for objective macroscopic physics.
Is objectivity a general feature of all physical theories? The answer is negative: here we show an explicit counterexample of a theory that does not allow any objective behavior, and therefore it cannot be regarded as fundamental. To avoid such cases, we enforce a principle of Emergence of Classical Concepts, stating that every fundamental theory must admit objective behavior in some suitable limit.
The emergence of objectivity is tightly linked to the emergence of classicality. For this reason, it is necessary to address how classical theory arises from a given theory. This is relevant because observers in physical laboratories interact with devices through classical physics: the outcomes of experiments are classical data that can be read from pointers in the devices. Again, any physical theory must explain how those data are generated out of the dynamics of the theory itself, and how the observation process takes place. For this reason, when a theory admits a classical sub-theory, we look for a decoherence process that transforms the original theory into that classical sub-theory. Surprisingly, we find that this process always exists in causal theories, namely in theories where information propagates from the past to the future [32] .
We then address the core issue-the emergence of objectivity-by recasting it as a multiplayer game. We find that all objective states in every causal theory with classical states are of the SBS form like in quantum the-ory. This very general result shows that the emergence of objectivity is widespread across physics, and not a phenomenon that can be only explained within quantum theory.
Finally, we address how local classical theories emerge out of composite systems. We show that, in order to guarantee a local character in the emergence of classicality, Causality is is no longer sufficient, but we can impose two additional axioms enforcing the lack of holistic behavior in composite systems.
A general framework for physical theories Our first challenge is to choose a suitable formalism for the study of arbitrary physical theories. We do this by adopting the framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs) [29-31, 33, 39] , which can address all physical theories admitting probabilistic processes. This framework has been used in several successful reconstructions of quantum theory from information-theoretic postulates [29, [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] , and it is the subject of active research in the quantum information community [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] . The essence of this approach is that any physical theory must describe experiments performed in a laboratory, and predict the probabilities of their outcomes. Here we give a brief overview of GPTs, referring the reader to appendix A and to [32, 53] for a more detailed and formal introduction.
The state ρ of a physical system A is associated with a preparation of it: the system is initialized by some preparation procedure in a laboratory. After that, one can manipulate it by applying some transformation T , which can possibly transform the input system into another system B. Finally, one can measure the final system B by applying an effect e to it: in this case the system does not exist any more, but is destroyed in the process. This can be represented schematically as
By repeating this experiment several times, the experimenter can estimate the probability of the overall process. Note that in this framework a state is viewed as a particular kind of transformation: a transformation without input system. Similarly, an effect is a transformation without output system.
If the output system of a transformation A matches the input system of another transformation B, we can apply B after A, and get a new transformation denoted BA. This corresponds to connecting the two associated devices in sequence:
Similarly, two transformations A and B can be applied independently, at the same time, on different systems. In this case the resulting transformation is denoted by A ⊗ B, and the two associated devices are composed in parallel:
It is important to note that all these processes (preparations, manipulations, observations) in general occur only probabilistically, and a generic physical experiment results in mutually exclusive outcomes, each of which corresponds to a particular process that occurred on the system. Think, for example, of a projective measurement on a quantum system: each outcome corresponds to the action of a particular projector on the state. Therefore the application of a generic non-deterministic device can be described as a collection of mutually exclusive processes {T i } i∈X , where i ∈ X represents the (classical) outcome read by the experimenter. We will call such a collection {T i } i∈X a test (measurement if it is a collection of effects). If a test is deterministic (i.e. there is a single outcome), we will call it a channel, and in this case there will be one transformation.
For every test, we can consider a coarse-grained version thereof, in which we join together some of the outcomes of X into a single outcome. The transformation associated with this coarse-graining is the sum of the transformations associated with the original outcomes: T = i∈Y T i , where Y is the subset of X corresponding to the outcomes joined together. Now, given a generic transformation (or a state, or an effect) it is crucial to determine if it can be realized by coarse-graining over more elementary transformations in a test. If this cannot be done-unless in a trivial way, i.e. T = i p i T , with {p i } a probability distribution-the transformation is called pure, otherwise it is called mixed.
This framework is so general that it can accommodate all physical theories, including those with counterintuitive behavior. For the scope of our investigation we put the fundamental restriction that in a physical theory information cannot come back from the future. This is enforced by the axiom of Causality [32] , satisfied by both classical and quantum theory.
Axiom 1 (Causality). The probability of a transformation occurring is independent of the choice of tests performed on its output.
Causality is equivalent to the existence of a unique deterministic effect u for every system [32] , which can be used as the analogue of the partial trace to discard systems in multipartite settings.
In causal theories it is enough to restrict ourselves to the states for which (u|ρ) = 1, called normalized states. All the other states, for which (u|ρ) = λ < 1, are multiples of normalized states, and can be thought of as states that are prepared with probability λ. From now on, we will just consider normalized states. Figure 1 . Simplices up to dimension 3. The vertices are the pure states, namely point-like probability distributions αi. Every other state can be obtained as a convex combination of the vertices.
If Causality holds, and all probabilities are allowed, the theory is convex (see appendix A for more details) [32] . Example 1. In quantum theory, states are positive semi-definite matrices with trace less than or equal to 1. Transformations are completely positive, trace-nonincreasing maps; effects are POVM elements, i.e. positive operators bounded from above by the identity. Pure states and pure effects are of the form λ |ψ ψ|, with λ ≤ 1. Pure transformations are those with only one Kraus operator. The unique deterministic effect is the trace; this means that normalized states are exactly those with trace 1.
Classical states Finite-dimensional classical theory is the theory of probability distributions over a finite set. Here states are probability distributions, and effects are all the linear functionals on probability distributions that yield a number in [0, 1]. In particular, the unique deterministic effect is the row-vector u = 1 . . . 1 , which yields 1 for all probability distributions. Geometrically, the state space is a simplex, with point-like probability distributions ( 1 0 . . . 0 T and its permutations) as vertices ( fig. 1) . One of the most notable features of classical theory is that classical pure states can be jointly distinguished in a single-shot measurement. This means that, if we do not know which classical pure state was prepared, there is a measurement that identifies the state with certainty. Now, all physical theories, as described by our framework, admit a classical interface by which the observer can read the outcome of an experiment, and interact with the transformations of the theory. In this picture, classical systems are present implicitly in the description of the physical theory as the pointers of the devices in a laboratory. Since every fundamental theory of Nature should be able to describe the process of observation as a Figure 3 . A cross-section of the effect space of classical trit (in orange) and a restricted trit (in blue). The restriction on effects is apparent.
physical process, it is imperative to include classical systems in the description, and to study how they emerge as explicit systems. The first step of this program is to characterize classical sub-theories of a generic theory by first identifying classical states. From the description of classical theory given above, we need to look for a set of pure states of the theory that are jointly distinguishable. Does this set always exist? Here we show that the answer is negative: a counterexample of a system of a theory with no distinguishable pure states is shown in figs. 2 and 3. This theory is essentially built out of a classical trit, but with a restriction on the physical effects, whereby not all linear functionals from probability distributions to [0, 1] are allowed. Despite having the same state space as classical theory, the three pure states are no longer distinguishable. Not just that: not even pairs of pure states are distinguishable. More details are provided in appendix B 2. It is important to note the crucial role played by the restriction on the set of effects: in appendix B 1 we show that if there is no restriction on the allowed effects, the theory admits at least the classical bit as a sub-theory. Clearly theories with no distinguishable pure states cannot be considered fundamental, because they do not allow classical states. In these theories we would be forced to accept an insurmountable division between the underlying physical world, and the macroscopic one through which the observer performs their experiments. We summarize this statement in the form of a principle:
Condition 1 (Emergence of Classical Concepts). A fundamental theory must have classical states (or arbitrarily good approximation thereof).
From now on, we will always assume that a theory has classical states. There are various ways to enforce the presence of them: by a mathematical principle (see appendix B 1), by postulating it directly [43, 48] , or by deriving it from more fundamental principles [40, 54] .
To study the classical features of a theory, we will pick a set of distinguishable pure states. We are interested in the "largest" classical theory that can emerge from a given set of distinguishable pure states; therefore we look for other pure states that can be added to the original ones, while keeping them jointly distinguishable. At some point we will not be able to add any more pure states because we would lose the distinguishability property. In this case we say that the set of pure states is maximal.
Example 2. In quantum theory maximal sets of distinguishable pure states are orthonormal bases.
For our purposes, we will pick one maximal set of distinguishable pure states
, and we will define the classical set α of dimension d as
This is the convex hull (i.e. the simplex) generated by the set of pure states
. This represents the states of a particular classical sub-theory of the theory itself.
Clearly, as we understood from the counterexample of the restricted trit, specifying the set of states is in general not enough to characterize a theory. We need also to assign effects to the classical sub-theory. The natural way to do this is to restrict the effects of the original theory to the classical set α, and to identify those that give the same probabilities on all classical states. These will be the classical effects: in appendix B 3 we show that the effects resulting from this restriction procedure are exactly all the effects of the classical theory with α as the state space. Now we know how to find classical sub-theories of a causal theory: it is enough to pick a classical set α, as this fixes both classical states and classical effects.
Decoherence After introducing this kinematic procedure to single out classical sub-theories of a given theory, now we describe the dynamical aspects of this. Indeed, for a complete description of the emergence of classicality we need to find a physical mechanism that enacts the transition to classical theory, which should be part of the physical transformations allowed by the theory. Such a mechanism has a deep foundational relevance, because it explains how the classical interface of a theory emerges out of the physical description and the dynamics of Nature.
In quantum theory the process operating the transition to classicality is decoherence [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] ; a similar mechanism in GPTs was studied in [55, 56] . In this letter we will take a different approach from [55, 56] , and focus on the minimal properties such a process should have. First of all, note that if classicality were reached only probabilistically, it would be an intrinsically unstable theory, which sometimes is reached, and other times it is not. This is obviously contrary to the experimental evidence. This motivates to search for the decoherence process among deterministic processes, i.e. among the channels of the theory. Moreover, a complete decoherence should send all states to classical states, and do nothing to classical states, because they are already classical. This motivates the following definition:
In a similar spirit, one can apply the complete decoherence to all the effects of the theory. Not so surprisingly, the decohered effects coincide with the set of classical effects defined through the restriction procedure explained above. This is shown in appendix C, along with other general properties of complete decoherence. The natural question is whether, given a classical set, a complete decoherence on it always exists. We find that the answer is affirmative. Consider the measurement
that distinguishes the pure states
. We can construct the measure-and-prepare test
. We can think of this test as a nondemolition measurement performed on the classical set α, because the system is not destroyed after performing the measurement. In quantum theory this corresponds to the von Neumann measurement on an orthonormal basis {|α j α j |} d j=1 . We know that in this case if we sum over all outcomes, we get the complete quantum decoherence; let us see if this idea works in a generic causal theory. By coarse-graining over the all the outcomes of {|α i ) (
we get the channel
The proof is provided in appendix C 1, along with some other physical properties, which make D α the most physically-motivated complete decoherence. In the light of this result, we will call every channel of the form
The significance of proposition 1 is that in all causal theories there always exists a complete decoherence on every classical set. Moreover, it is remarkable that neglecting the outcome of a non-demolition measurement on a classical set always causes decoherence in every causal theory. Measurement-induced decoherence presents another intriguing feature. Recall that in quantum theory decoherence is always associated with the presence of an environment where information is leaked. Instead in definition 1, as well as in the others proposed in the GPT literature [55, 56] , the environment does not seem to play any explicit role in the process. However, with the measurement-induced decoherence the environment and the presence of external observers are again present, albeit implicitly. Indeed, the fact that the measurement-induced decoherence arises as the coarsegraining of a test means that, at least in principle, an external observer is present in the process of decoherence.
Objectivity Game After studying how classicality emerges from a causal theory, the natural continuation of our analysis is to study one of the main features associated with classical and macroscopic physics, which is objectivity. Indeed, it is common experience that in the macroscopic world different observers agree on their findings, and in this work we want to find the ultimate origins of this objective behavior. Specifically we want to understand whether the emergence of objectivity poses any physical constraints on a fundamental theory of Nature. We use the setting of quantum Darwinism [11, 14] , in which a system is surrounded by an environment composed of several fragments, each of which accessible to one observer. In quantum theory, objective states have a particular form, called Spectrum Broadcast Structure (SBS) [5, 17, 19-21, 23, 25, 26] . These states are of the form
where for every environment fragment E k the states
The first thing we need to understand in GPTs is what objectivity means. Recall that a state of a system is objective if multiple observers can find it out without perturbing it [4, 11] . Here we extend the non-disturbance criterion presented in [5, 57, 58 ] to arbitrary physical theories with the following definition (cf. also [59] ):
It is very useful to recast the concept of objectivity in terms of a multiplayer game, which we call the objectivity game (OG). In this game the goal is to determine the state, taken from a classical set α, of a target system S. There are n players who act independently by measuring some environment fragment E k , correlated with the system, in such a way that the joint state is not disturbed. This so-called Bohr non-disturbance criterion [57, 58] is argued to be the right concept in this situation [5] . We also assume that there is a special observer on system S acting as a referee to check the findings of the n players. They win if they are able to determine the state of the target system without disturbing the joint state ρ SE1...En , in the sense of definition 2. This situation is represented in fig. 4 . We insist that the n players should act independently in this game, therefore we enforce the following condition [5] (see also [26] ):
Figure 4. The setting of the objectivity game: the system S where the referee is, and multiple environments Ei, each representing an observer.
Condition 2 (Strong independence)
. The only correlations between the different players is the common information about the system.
In general, to determine a state, several rounds of measurements are necessary, but the players cannot change their measurement between the various rounds. For this reason, all the observers, including the referee, want to be able to repeat their measurements several times. To be consistent, they run a particular kind of test, which guarantees that when the test is performed multiple times, the outcome is always the same [59] (cf. [60, 61] for related definitions).
Notably, SRM are present in every causal theory admitting classical states, the proof is presented in appendix D 1. In quantum theory obvious examples are von Neumann measurements, but also all measureand-prepare quantum instruments {M j } of the form M j (ρ) = tr (P j ρ) ρ j , where {ρ j } are states with orthogonal support, and P j is the projector on the support of ρ j . Non-disturbing sharply repeatable measurement were identified as providing objective information in causal theories in [59] .
The first move of the OG is from the referee who performs a SRM associated with some classical set α of S (see appendix D 1). Since the outcome is not communicated to the players, the system is decohered, so that its state before the action of the players is ρ S = r i=1 p i α i , where p i > 0 for every i.
The winning condition for this game can be expressed as the fact that all players obtain the same outcome as the referee, i.e. they agree on the observation of the target state. Such an agreement about the target state encodes the operational meaning of objectivity, hence the joint state of the target system and players that allows the players to win the OG is an objective state. It is not hard to show that states in the SBS form are objective (appendix D 2), so every causal theory has objective states.
Definition 4. A state is a spectrum broadcast state (SBS) if it is of the form
where
are distinguishable pure states, and for every k,
are distinguishable too. The interesting question is the characterization of all objective states of a theory. Here we prove something remarkably strong: the states of the SBS form are the only objective states in every causal theory. The proof is provided in appendix D 2. This result expresses the universality of the features of objectivity across physical theories, meaning that objectivity is a vital concept for physics itself. Moreover the fact that all objective states are SBS, which means classical-classical states, shows that classical theory is a necessary interface between the physical world and observers. Without it, no observers could agree at all about the observations of the physical world they would make.
Emergence of local classical theories Motivated by the OG, we want to study how classicality arises in a multipartite setting. We focus on the bipartite case for simplicity, but the generalization to more than two parties is straightforward. Suppose we have a bipartite system AB of a causal theory with classical states. This means that there is a classical set α on A, and a classical set β on B. What is the classical set associated with the bipartite system? If the theory allows local classical systems, this is obtained from the composition of the classical set α with the classical set β (see appendix E for more details in this respect), as if they were ordinary classical systems. In particular, this implies that the pure states of the classical set for AB should be all of the form α i ⊗ β j , where α i is a pure state of α, and β j a pure state of β. However, here we face two problems. The first is that the product of two pure states may not be pure in general, as shown in [62] ; and the second is that the set {α i ⊗ β j } may not be maximal for the composite system AB as shown in [63] , which means that there are extra pure states to add. To avoid these problems, we impose the following two axioms:
Axiom 2. The product of two pure states is a pure state.
is a pure maximal set of A, and {β j } dB j=1 is a pure maximal set of B,
j=1 is a pure maximal set of AB.
These axioms represent a "locality constraint" in the emergence of classicality. Indeed if these two axioms fail, the theory does not allow the emergence of local observers, but instead it shows some holistic behavior. Indeed, if the first axiom fails, and the product of two pure states is not pure, the idea that the classical states of a composite system be reducible to the classical states of its components faces an insurmountable difficulty. In this case, since the product states are mixed, the theory is so holistic that, in order to construct the classical set for the composite system, we have to look for completely different states. If, instead, the theory satisfies axiom 2, but it fails Information Locality, we can construct the classical set for AB partially out of α and β, but we need some extra pure states of AB to make it maximal. Even in this case the theory shows a holistic behavior, and does not support the emergence of local classical theories. If both axioms are satisfied, we have that the classical set for the composite system AB is given by
After this kinematic analysis, let us examine the dynamical aspect, namely how decoherence behaves with composite systems. If the classicality of the composite system can be reduced to the ones of its subsystems, we expect that decohering AB will be the same as decohering A and B separately. In formula D αβ = D α ⊗ D β . Even if the theory satisfies both axioms 2 and 3, this property may not be satisfied by general complete decoherences, but it is instead by measurement-induced decoherences. A discussion is presented in appendix E. This fact is another strong evidence that the measurement-induced decoherence is the only physically-motivated form of decoherence in general theories.
Discussion Simplicity is not only of aesthetic value, it has a methodological significance as it reveals the true content and essence of results. This is the advantage of our approach: the minimality of assumptions about GPTs clearly exhibits what is actually necessary for the existence of a transition to classicality and the emergence of objective states. It is just Causality, in conjunction with the principle of Emergence of Classical Concepts, which guarantees the presence of classical states in a theory. The introduction of this principle was motivated by the counterexample of a theory where the transition to classicality was impossible.
These two very general principles are enough to guarantee the existence of a decoherence map to every classical sub-theory of a given theory. In particular, the most physically-motivated form of decoherence arises from measuring and forgetting the outcome, exactly like in quantum theory. This shows that the act of observation is inexorably associated with the emergence of classical behavior. The same two principles, augmented with the Strong Independence condition, also imply that objective states have the same form-the SBS form-in all theories. This very general result suggests two things.
First, that objectivity is widespread in physics, therefore we can conjecture it to be even necessary to do physics. Second, the fact that all objective states are classical states suggests that classical theory is indeed a necessary interface between observers and the physical world, otherwise no observers could agree on their findings. However, finally, we showed that Causality is not enough to guarantee the emergence of localized classical theories out of the dynamics of a theory, but we show that two additional axioms are enough to eliminate any holistic behavior.
In conclusion, our results support the approach to objectivity presented in [5, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] based on SBS states, recently shown to be stronger than the notion of quantum Darwinism [26] . Our results extend the validity of this approach far beyond the limits of quantum mechanics. They also suggest that other approaches to the classical transition, such as quantum Darwinism and the associated broadcasting of information to the environment [64] could be extended to GPTs, opening a fruitful new research field we intend to investigate in subsequent works.
There are indeed still some open questions for future work. For instance, we showed that the most physicallymotivated form of decoherence arises from a measurement. In it, the environment is present implicitly through the observer that performs the measurement. It is therefore natural to study when a decoherence process involves the explicit presence of an environment, and what role this environment plays in the emergence of classicality. General probabilistic theories (GPTs) are a framework for describing arbitrary physical theories admitting probabilistic processes. Here we focus on a variant of them based on the graphical language of circuits [32, 33, 40, 65, 66] , describing physical systems on which physical processes occur. The main idea is that every physical theory should be able to describe experiments performed in a laboratory. These experiments are usually carried out by connecting several devices. Each device represents a physical process, and wires connecting them carry physical systems. Therefore for every physical transformation T transforming system A into system B (e.g. a beam splitter, a Stern-Gerlach magnet, etc.), it is natural to represent it as Processes with no input are called states, and those with no output are called effects. One can build arbitrary circuits by connecting these devices, such as . This can be read at the same time as an instruction about how to build an actual experiment, and as the way physical processes are connected in the same experiment. This framework allows one to treat states, effects, and transformations on equal footing, by introducing a special system, the trivial system I which represents the lack of a system. For this reason, the composition of a system A with the trivial system does not involve any change: AI = IA = A.
In general, the experimenter does not have full control over the transformation they can implement; this is because in Nature there are also non-deterministic processes. Therefore, what we can say is that every device in an experiment implements a collection of mutually exclusive alternatives. Only one of them can occur in a run of the experiment, and the experimenter can read which process actually occurred by looking at the outcome of the experiment. For this reason, we can associate a collection of transformations {T i } i∈X , called test, with every device, where i is the outcome, and X the set of outcomes. A special kind of test are measurements (or observation-tests) {a i } i∈X , which are collections of effects. It is therefore natural to ask ourselves about the probability that a particular transformation occurs in an experiment. Probabilities are represented by circuits with no external wires like
This circuit represents the joint probability p ijklmn to observe all these specific transformations in the experiment. If a test is deterministic, i.e. there is only one transformation associated with it, it is called channel.
We will often make use of the following short-hand notations, inspired by quantum theory, to mean some common diagrams occurring in our analysis.
1.
(a|ρ) := ρ A a ; 2.
In particular, the transformation represented in 3 is called a measure-and-prepare transformation, because first the effect a (representing a measurement outcome) occurs, and then the state ρ is prepared. Now, for any state ρ and every effect a, (a|ρ) ∈ [0, 1], whereby a state of system A becomes a map from the set of effects Eff The idea behind this definition is that two states (i.e. the associated preparations of a system) are indistinguishable if there is no measurement to witness their difference. In this case they must be identified as states.
Similarly, every effect gives rise to a map from the set of states St (A) to the unit interval, and one identifies effects that produce the same probabilities on all states. Figure 5 . The outcome set X of the test {Ai} i∈X has 10 outcomes. To perform a coarse-graining of it, we lump together some of its outcomes, relabeling them as a new outcome. For example, the outcomes i1, i2, and i3 are relabeled as j1. This gives rise to a partition {Xj} j∈Y of X. We associate a new transformation with each set in the partition, such that it is the sum of the transformations associated with the outcomes contained in that set. Thus Bj 1 = Ai 1 + Ai 2 + Ai 3 . The new test {Bj} j∈Y has 5 outcomes.
As states and effects are maps to a subset of real numbers, they can be summed, and one can take their multiple by a real number. In this way, the set of states and the set of effects become spanning sets of real vector spaces, denoted St R (A) and Eff R (A), which we assume to be finite-dimensional. If one considers only linear combinations with non-negative coefficients (conical combinations), one obtains the cone of states St + (A) and the cone of effects Eff + (A). In this way, one can see how the convex geometric approach to GPTs arises [30, 35] . Once the cone of states is defined, one can consider the dual cone St * + (A): this is the cone of linear functionals that are non-negative on St + (A). Clearly Eff + (A) ⊆ St * + (A), but we will discuss this inclusion in greater detail in appendix B 1 to examine its consequences for the emergence of classicality.
In this setting a transformation from A to B is a completely positive map from St R (A) to St R (B). Here a positive map is a map sending an element of the input cone of states to an element of the output cone of states. A map T is completely positive if T ⊗ I S is a positive map, for any system S, where I S is the identity on system S. Complete positivity plays a crucial role in defining tomographically distinct transformations [32, 53] . This definition will have some implications for the definition of decoherence (appendix C). Definition 6. Two transformations A and B from system A to system B are tomographically distinct if there exists a system S and a bipartite state ρ ∈ St (AS) such that
If the theory satisfies an axiom called Local Tomography [29, 32, 40, 42, 67, 68] , by which product effects are enough to do tomography on bipartite states, like in quantum theory, then the ancillary system S is not necessary to distinguish transformations [32] .
The linear structure introduced above allows us to talk about the coarse-graining of tests. Suppose one has the test {A i } i∈X . The action of coarse-graining means joining together some of the outcomes of this test to build a different test. This concept is easily explained by fig. 5 . Formally, a test {B j } j∈Y is a coarse-graining of the test {A i } i∈X if there exists a partition {X j } j∈Y of X such that B j = i∈Xj A i . In this case we say that {A i } i∈X is a refinement of {B j } j∈Y . We also say that every transformation A i , with i ∈ X j , is a refinement of the transformation B j . Clearly, by performing the coarse-graining over all the outcomes of a test, we obtain a deterministic test, i.e. a channel: A = i∈X A i .
The natural question at this stage is to understand when a transformation T is of "primitive nature", or instead arises from the coarse-graining of other transformations in some experiment.
Definition 7.
A transformation T is pure if all its refinements are of the form p i T , where {p i } is a probability distribution. A non-pure transformation is called mixed.
Finally we assume that the set of states is topologically closed. Here the topology is defined by the sequences of states: we say that the sequence {ρ n } n∈N converges to the state ρ if, for every effect a, lim n→+∞ (a|ρ n ) = (a|ρ). From a physical point of view, requiring the closure of the state space means that anything that can arbitrarily well approximated by a physical state must be a physical state itself. In summary: a state is indistinguishable from its arbitrarily good approximations. 
Consequences of Causality
For the scope of the present analysis we will restrict ourselves to causal theories [32] , which are those where information propagates from the past to the future. This is expressed in the Causality axiom as a no-signaling condition from the future.
Axiom 4 (Causality [32] ). For every state ρ, take two measurements {a i } i∈X and {b j } j∈Y . One has i∈X (a i |ρ) = j∈Y (b j |ρ) .
Causality is equivalent to the existence of a unique deterministic effect u [32] . We can use this deterministic effect to discard systems when dealing with composite systems. The marginal of a bipartite state can be defined as:
.
Sometimes we will keep tr as a notation for the unique deterministic effect when it is applied directly to states. In causal theories the set of states has a particular structure: it can be divided in two disjoint subsets, the set for which (u|ρ) = 1, and the set for which (u|ρ) < 1. The former is called the set of normalized states, and corresponds to states that can be prepared deterministically. The latter, of sub-normalized states, has a peculiar structure too: every element can be thought of as a probabilistic rescaling of a normalized state, namely as a state that can be prepared only probabilistically, where (u|ρ) gives exactly that probability. Therefore, in causal theories it suffices to focus on normalized states, and from now on, when writing about states and the state space, we will always mean normalized states, unless specified otherwise. A geometric picture of the cone of states in a causal theory is shown in fig. 6 . It is possible to show that in a causal theory where all probabilities are allowed-something we are going to assume-the state space is a compact convex set [32, 44, 53] . Note that given a measurement {a i } i∈X , i∈X a i = u because the sum means a coarse-graining over all the effects of the measurement, and therefore it must be the unique deterministic effect. Hence when we apply that measurement on a state ρ, it yields a probability distribution {p i } i∈X , where p i := (a i |ρ). This shows that every state is a probabilistic assignment to any measurement, therefore recovering the usual picture of states in the convex approach to GPTs [30, 31, 35] . Similarly, it is easy to prove that channels preserve the deterministic effect: uC = u. This is the generalization of the quantum property that channels are trace-preserving. In particular, if we have a test {A i } i∈X , one has i∈X uA i = u.
If in a theory information flows from the past to the future, like in causal theories, it is possible to choose what experiment to perform now based on the outcome of a previous one [32, 53] . This fact is so strongly linked to Causality that the ability to perform all classically-controlled experiments (i.e. chosen according to the outcome of a previous experiment) is equivalent to Causality itself [44, 53] . A particular example of a classically-controlled test is a measure-and-prepare test.
Definition 8.
A test {A i } i∈X is measure-and-prepare if A i = |ρ i ) (a i | for some measurement {a i } i∈X . A channel A is measure-and-prepare if it is the complete coarse-graining of a measure-and-prepare test.
A measure-and-prepare test is a classically-controlled test because the state ρ i is prepared if the effect a i happens.
Appendix B: Features of classicality
In this appendix we study some the fundamental properties of classical states, and how classical theory can be singled out among all other causal theories. It turns out that its key feature is that all pure states are jointly distinguishable. This means that there exists a measurement that distinguishes them in a single shot. Let us formalize this idea.
Besides, if there is no other state ρ 0 such that the states {ρ i } n i=0 are distinguishable, the set
is said maximal.
Now we can state the role of distinguishability in singling out classical states.
Proposition 2.
If all pure states of a causal theory are distinguishable, the theory is classical.
Proof. Suppose we have n pure states {ψ i } n i=1 of some system A. Requiring that they be distinguishable implies that they are linearly independent as vectors in St R (A). To see it, let {a i } n i=1 be the associated measurement. Then if we consider n i=1 λ i ψ i = 0, where λ i ∈ R, and we apply a j to both sides, we get λ j = 0, for all j = 1, . . . , n. Being n linearly independent vectors, they span an n-dimensional vector space. This means that the state space is a simplex. Now, let us examine the set of effects. By a similar argument, the effects {a i } n i=1 are linearly independent. Let us also show that these effects are pure. Suppose by contradiction that a generic a i is not pure, i.e. a i = k e k,i . Taking j = i, the fact that (a i |ψ j ) = 0 implies that (e k,i |ψ j ) = 0. Since effects are completely defined by their action on a basis of the vector space of states, e k,i = λ k,i a i , where λ k,i is a non-negative number. The condition a i = k e k,i for every i implies that {λ k,i } is a probability distribution. This shows that every a i is a pure effect. Hence the cone spanned by the {a i } n i=1 , which coincides with the dual cone St * + (A), is the whole effect cone Eff + (A). In this case all allowed mathematical effects are physical too, so there is no restriction on the effects. This is therefore classical theory.
This motivates the choice of classical states as the convex hull of a maximal set of distinguishable pure states.
The role of the no-restriction hypothesis
In appendix A we saw how one can define the cone of states St + (A) and its dual St * + (A), given by linear functionals that are non-negative on St + (A). We also saw that one can define the cone of effects Eff + (A), generated by conical combinations of effects. Clearly, all the elements of Eff + (A) are linear functionals that yield a non-negative number when applied to elements of St + (A). Therefore one has Eff + (A) ⊆ St * + (A). It is interesting to study when one has the equality in this inclusion.
Condition 3 (No-restriction hypothesis [32] ). We say that a theory is non-restricted, or that it satisfies the norestriction hypothesis, if Eff + (A) = St * + (A) for every system. While this may look just a statement of mathematical interest, it has some important physical implications. Consider the subset of St * + (A) made of linear functionals f such that (f |ρ) ∈ [0, 1] for all states ρ. In a non-restricted theory, these elements f are also valid effects. In other words, the no-restriction hypothesis states that every mathematically allowed effect is also a physical effect. Clearly the no-restriction hypothesis concerns more the mathematical structure of the theory than its operational one. Indeed, it is the duty of the physical theory to specify what objects are to be considered physical effects, even if they are admissible in principle based on their mathematical properties. For this reason, the no-restriction hypothesis has been questioned various times on the basis of its lack of operational motivation [32, 69, 70] . Moreover, recently it has been show that theories with almost quantum correlations [71] violate the no-restriction hypothesis [72] .
Examples of theories that satisfy the no-restriction hypothesis are classical and quantum theory. In appendix B 2 we present a theory that does not satisfy it, and, as a consequence, it does not allow the emergence of classicality. Indeed, one of the most important consequences of the no-restriction hypothesis is that a non-restricted theory always admits at least the classical bit as a sub-theory.
Proposition 3. In a non-restricted theory, for every pure state ψ 1 there exists another pure state ψ 2 such that {ψ 1 , ψ 2 } are distinguishable.
Proof. Let ψ 1 be a pure state. The proof will consist of some steps. In the first step, let us prove that there exists a non-trivial element f of the dual cone St * + (A) such that (f |ψ 1 ) = 0. Note that being pure, ψ 1 lies in some supporting hyperplane through the origin of the cone St + (A) [73] . Such a hyperplane must have equation (f |x) = 0 for all x ∈ St R (A), where f is some non-trivial linear functional on St R (A), otherwise it would not pass through the origin (i.e. the null vector). Being a supporting hyperplane, we can choose f to be in the dual cone St * + (A) [73] . Thus we have found f ∈ St * + (A) such that (f |ψ 1 ) = 0. Let us consider the maximum of f on the state space. Since f is continuous and the state space is compact, it achieves its maximum λ * on some state ρ * . Note that λ * > 0, otherwise f would be the zero functional. Let us show that the maximum is attained on some pure state. If ρ * is already a pure state, there is nothing to prove. If it is not, consider a refinement of ρ * in terms of pure states, ρ * = i p i ψ i , where {p i } is a probability distribution. Apply f to ρ * :
Clearly λ * ≤ max (f |ψ i ), but being λ * the maximum of f , in fact λ * = max (f |ψ i ). This means that there is a pure state ψ 2 , chosen among these ψ i 's, on which f attains its maximum. Now consider the functional a 2 := f λ * , which takes values in the interval [0, 1] when applied to states. Specifically (a 2 |ψ 2 ) = 1 and (a 2 |ψ 1 ) = 0. By the no-restriction hypothesis, it is a valid effect, so we can construct the measurement {a 1 , a 2 }, where a 1 := u − a 2 , which distinguishes between ψ 1 and ψ 2 .
The gist of this proposition is that in every non-restricted physical theory there are at least two distinguishable pure states. By possibly adding other pure states so that the overall set is distinguishable, one can find a maximal set of distinguishable pure states. In this way one can always construct a classical set for every system, of dimension at least 2.
Even though the no-restriction hypothesis guarantees the existence of classical sets, we do not wish to assume it for its lack of operational motivation, preferring to stick to condition 1, which is agnostic about the reason why classical states arise in a theory.
A theory with no classical states
Here we present a theory without classical states, the theory of restricted trits. It is constructed from a classical trit, and it explicitly violates the no-restriction hypothesis of classical theory.
We start with the state space of the classical trit, represented in fig. 2 , with pure states α 1 , α 2 , α 3 . Let {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } be the measurement that distinguishes the α i 's in a single shot: (a i |α j ) = δ ij . Instead of allowing the full set of effects of classical theory, suppose that, for some reasons, the most fine-grained effects that are allowed are e ij = 1 2 (a i + a j ), with i < j. A section of the dual cone (the same as the effect cone of classical theory), and of the effect cone of the restricted trit is represented in fig. 3 .
Since we have a smaller set of effects than the original classical trit, we must check what happens to the state space. Indeed it may happen that two states become tomographically indistinguishable because there are not enough effects to witness their difference (cf. definition 5). However, this is not the case of the restricted trit. The reason is that the effects e ij are linearly independent, therefore they span exactly the same effect vector space as the effects a i , which is what determines the tomographic power of a theory. Therefore the state space of the restricted trit coincides with that of the classical trit (cf. fig. 2) .
However, the restriction on the allowed effects has a dramatic consequence: there are no distinguishable pure states, therefore no classical states. 23 , where λ ij ≥ 0. This effect could yield 0 on α 2 and α 3 if and only if λ 12 = λ 13 = λ 23 = 0, but this would be the zero effect, which cannot yield 1 on α 1 . This means that the α i 's cannot be jointly distinguishable.
First of all
Maybe we can still find a pair of α i 's that are distinguishable? The answer is again negative. To see it, take e.g. the pair {α 1 , α 2 } (for the others the argument is the same). The only element in the effect cone that yields 1 on α 1 and 0 on α 2 is 2e 13 , but this is not a physical effect, because u − 2e 13 = a 2 , which is not an effect. In other words, 2e 13 cannot exist in a measurement of the form {2e 13 , u − 2e 13 }, but all effects must be part of some measurement! In conclusion, the restricted trit has no classical states.
What about the other systems of this theory? They are generated by composing restricted trits using the minimal tensor product [35, 74] : the normalized states of the composite system AB are given by the convex hull of product states of A and B:
where the subscript 1 means that we are only considering normalized states. This is how ordinary classical systems compose. Similarly the effect cones (generated by the extreme effects e ij ) are composed using the minimal tensor product of cones, whereby
where Con denotes the conical hull. The generic system of this theory is obtained by composing N restricted trits. Therefore it has 3 N pure states and 3 N extreme effects, given by e i1j1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ e i N j N , where for each k ∈ {1, . . . , N } one has i k < j k , with i k , j k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and e i k j k = 1 2 (a i k + a j k ). Given that the {e i k j k } are linearly independent for every k ∈ {1, . . . , N }, the effects {e i1j1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ e i N j N } are still linearly independent, therefore they span the same vector space as the effects {a i1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ a i N }. This means that all states will stay tomographically distinct, and the state space of a composite of N restricted trits will look like the composite of N classical trits, namely like a simplex with 3 N vertices. Let us show that even in composites we still have a restriction on the allowed classical effects, given by the dual cone. To this end, let us show that, for instance, we cannot obtain the effect a ⊗N 1 out of conical combinations of the extreme effects e i1j1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ e i N j N (for other products of the a i 's the argument is the same). Our goal is to determine the non-negative coefficients λ i1j1,...,i N j N such that
. . .
Recalling the definition of e i k j k we have
Unfolding the above expression, we get
where primed summations indicate the other summation terms in eq. (B3). Clearly, primed summations must vanish, but since λ i1j1,...,i N j N ≥ 0, all coefficients λ i1j1,...,i N j N in primed summations must vanish. Note that the coefficients λ 1j1,...,1j N arise among the coefficients in the primed summations, which are all zero. This means that a ⊗N 1 = 0, which contradicts the hypothesis. It follows that it is not possible to obtain products of the a i 's from conical combination of the extreme effects e i1j1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ e i N j N . In other words, we are still in the presence of a restriction on the set of mathematically allowed effects.
Let us show that even in composites of the restricted trit there are no distinguishable pure states. To this end, it is enough to show that there are no pairs of distinguishable pure states. Indeed, if the states
is also a set of distinguishable states: they are distinguished by the measurement {a 1 , u − a 1 }. Note that in all composites pure states are only of the product form; specifically they are the states α i1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ α i N for the composition of N restricted trits. Now we will show by induction on N that there are no pairs of distinguishable pure states in any composite in the theory of restricted trits. For N = 1 we have already proved it. Now suppose this is true for N , and let us show that it valid also for N + 1. Take system A to be the composition of N restricted trits, and let B be a single restricted trit. Suppose by contradiction that system AB, given by the composition of N + 1 restricted trits has two distinguishable pure states. They must be of the form {α 1 ⊗ β 1 , α 2 ⊗ β 2 }, where {α 1 , α 2 } are pure states of A, and {β 1 , β 2 } are pure states of B.
Since {α 1 ⊗ β 1 , α 2 ⊗ β 2 } are distinguishable, there exists a measurement {E 1 , E 2 } on AB such that
Now, by eq. (B2), E 1 is a conical combination of product of the extreme effects:
where a i,1 and b i,1 are extreme effects of A and B respectively. Then we have
Note that not all λ i,1 can be zero, otherwise E 1 would be the zero vector. Therefore we have two possibilities, which can be both true at the same time:
1. (a i,1 |α 2 ) = 0 for every i. In this case, consider the effect e 1 of A defined as e 1 :
We have
because (a i,1 |α 2 ) = 0 for every i. This means that the pure states {α 1 , α 2 } are distinguished by the measurement {e 1 , u − e 1 }. This contradicts the induction hypothesis that for the composite of N restricted trits (system A) there are no distinguishable pure states.
2. (b i,1 |β 2 ) = 0 for every i. The proof is essentially the same as in the previous case. Consider the effect f 1 of B, defined as
One has
because (b i,1 |β 2 ) = 0 for every i. Hence the pure states {β 1 , β 2 } are distinguished by the measurement {f 1 , u − f 1 }. This contradicts the fact that there are no distinguishable pure states in the restricted trit (system B).
In conclusion, we have proved that in all composite systems in the theory of restricted trits there are no distinguishable pure states.
Classical effects
Once we have picked a classical set α, which is the state space of a classical sub-theory, we must find what effects to consider. Indeed, the counterexample of the restricted trit in appendix B 2 showed that the choice of effects can have dramatic effects on the structure of a theory. Even if the state space looks classical, like in fig. 2 , the theory can be very different from classical theory.
Given a classical set α, the natural way to assign effects to this classical sub-theory is to restrict the effects of the original theory to the set α, identifying those that are not tomographically distinct on α. More precisely, let us introduce the following equivalence relation on the original set of effects Eff (A): e ∼ α f if (e|γ) = (f |γ) for every classical state γ in α. The set of effects of the classical sub-theory is the set of equivalence classes Eff (A) /α := Eff (A) / ∼ α .
We need to show that this restricted set of effects Eff (A) /α is actually the set of effects of some classical theory. Recall that in classical theory, every element in the cone of effects arises as a conical combination of the effects that distinguish the pure states. In our setting this means checking that every element of Eff + (A) /α arises as a conical combination of the equivalence classes [a i ] of the effects that distinguish the pure states α i in α. Note that it is not hard to see that Eff + (A) /α is still a cone, with the sum and the multiplication by a scalar inherited from Eff + (A). Consider a generic element ξ in Eff + (A), and let us show that it is in the same equivalence class as ξ = d i=1 λ i a i , where λ i = (ξ|α i ) for all i. By linearity, to check the equivalence of two elements of Eff + (A), it is enough to check that they produce the same numbers when applied to all pure states α j . Now,
This shows that the restricted effect cone Eff + (A) /α of the sub-theory is actually a classical effect cone, generated by the effects that distinguish the pure states in α.
1. We can have two complete decoherences, D 1,α and D 2,α , that decohere some state ρ to different classical states: 
Properties of the measurement-induced decoherence
After dealing with the issues related to the uniqueness of decoherence on a given classical set α, let us tackle the most important issue, namely whether a complete decoherence actually exists. In appendix A 1 we saw that in causal theories one can always construct measure-and-prepare tests. Now we will construct one out of the pure states
, which can be viewed as a non-demolition measurement on the classical set α. Taking the coarse-graining over all d outcomes yields a measure-and-prepare channel
As announced in proposition 1, D α is a complete decoherence, which we term the measurement-induced decoherence (MID).
Proof. We must check if D α satisfies the two properties of definition 1.
1. For any state ρ,
where we have set p i := (a i |ρ). Note that p i ∈ [0, 1], and that
is a measurement. Therefore D α ρ is a classical state, lying in the simplex generated by the α i 's.
For any α i we have
This means that D α preserves all pure states in α, and by linearity it preserves all classical states in α.
This shows that a complete decoherence always exists in causal theories, and it is caused by the act of measuring. The MID enjoys some remarkable properties that make it a physically-motivated form of decoherence. Some of them are presented in the following proposition, and another in appendix E.
be the measurement associated with the classical set α. The MID D α satisfies the following properties:
2. a i D α = a i for every i.
Proof. Let us prove the two properties.
1. Let us compose the MID with itself:
Figure 7. The state space of the square bit. Here α1, α2, α3, and α4 are pure states. The classical set α = Conv {α1, α2} is shown in black.
2. It is a straightforward calculation. Indeed
Note that property 1 means that the MID satisfies a stronger idempotence property than a generic complete decoherence: not only is this property valid on single systems, but also when the MID is applied to a part of a bipartite state. Again, this means that to decohere a system completely, it is enough to apply the MID just once: further applications of the MID will not change anything.
Property 2 states that the MID preserves the effects that distinguish the pure states in α. Since all classical effects arise as suitable conical combinations of these effects, it means that the MID preserves each classical effect. This property removes the asymmetry we observed in the behavior of complete decoherences, which in general preserve only classical states, but not classical effects. The MID, instead, treats classical states and effects on equal footing, doing nothing to both of them. This makes it more physically appealing.
The previous contributions on decoherence in GPTs [55, 56] required the complete decoherence to be strictly puritydecreasing [55] , or alternatively, that if a decohered state is pure, the original state was pure too [56] . In the following counterexample we show that the MID does not satisfy these desiderata in general: in some theories mixed states can be decohered to pure states. Example 3. Let us consider the square bit [30] . Here the state space is a square, and the pure states are its vertices. This theory satisfies the no-restriction hypothesis, so all mathematically allowed effects are valid effects. The pure states are the vertices of the square. Fig. 7 shows the state space. The pure states are the vectors
where the third component represents the fact that these states are normalized. Now consider the effects
They make up a measurement {a 1 , a 2 } that distinguishes the pure states {α 1 , α 2 } in a single shot. Therefore we can consider the classical set α = Conv {α 1 , α 2 }, which is simply the segments connecting α 1 and α 2 (see fig. 7 ). Now consider the MID D α = |α 1 ) (a 1 | + |α 2 ) (a 2 |. Note that D α decoheres the mixed state From this expression it is immediate to see that
in other words the MID horizontally projects all states to the x-component of their above parametrization, which lives of course in α. This is illustrated in fig. 9 . From this geometric picture it is clear that D α decoheres all the mixed states of the form pα 1 + (1 − p) α 4 , and pα 2 + (1 − p) α 3 , with p ∈ (0, 1), to pure states (α 1 and α 2 respectively).
The natural question is when this counter-intuitive, purity-increasing behavior of the MID can be observed in a theory. In general, it is enough that one of the distinguishing effects {a i } d i=1 , say a 1 , gives 1 on another pure state ψ not in the classical set α. To show it, first note that since {a i } d i=1 is a measurement, if (a 1 |ψ) = 1, then (a i |ψ) = 0 for i > 1. Now take any mixed state of the form pα 1 + (1 − p) ψ, with p ∈ (0, 1); the MID D α = d i=1 |α i ) (a i | decoheres it to the pure state α 1 . In example 3, a 1 gave 1 also on α 4 , which was not in the classical set. Similarly, a 2 yielded 1 on α 3 too, again not in the classical set.
where the P i 's are transformations in a SRM on E, then ρ SE must be of the form
where {ρ i } r i=1 are distinguishable states of E. Proof. Let us rewrite eq. (D2) in diagrams. Now we can give the proof of our main result, theorem 1.
Proof. In the setting of the game, if the referee checks the findings with the SRM {|α i ) (a i |} d i=1 on S, and the other players apply some SRMs {P j k ,E k } on each E k , the probability of a joint outcome (i, j 1 , . . . , j n ) is p ij1...jn = tr [(|α i ) (a i | ⊗ P j1,E1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ P jn,En ) ρ SE ] .
Imposing the agreement condition we must have p ij1...jn = 0 unless i = j 1 = . . . = j n [5] . This means that, if we forget the outcome, the state after the measurement is i,j1,...,jn (|α i ) (a i | ⊗ P j1,E1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ P jn,En ) ρ SE = d i=1 (|α i ) (a i | ⊗ P i,E1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ P i,En ) ρ SE . Now, let us define P i := P i,E1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ P i,En , which is a SRM on E. Imposing the non-disturbance condition of definition 2 to the test {|α i ) (a i | ⊗ P i }, we find
(|α i ) (a i | ⊗ P i,E ) ρ SE = ρ SE . Now we are in the situation of lemma 2, so we know that ρ SE must be of the form ρ = r i=1 p i α i ⊗ ρ i , where the ρ i 's are distinguishable states of E. Imposing the strong independence condition, ρ i must be a product state, with the only correlations given by the index i:
where for every k, the states {ρ i,E k } r i=1 are distinguishable. This concludes the proof.
Appendix E: Local classical theories
The fact that classical theory does not allow entangled states is apparent from the way classical systems compose. Recall they do according to the minimal tensor product as in eq. (B1). This equivalent to saying that in classical theory all bipartite states are separable.
Consider now a bipartite system AB of a generic causal theory, and suppose system A has the classical set α, and system B the classical set β. If α is to represent an actual classical sub-theory for system A, and β an actual classical sub-theory for system B, it is natural to expect that the classical set for the composite system should mirror the composition of classical theory. Consequently, we would like to define the composite classical set as αβ := Conv {γ A ⊗ γ B : γ A ∈ α, γ B ∈ β} , but in general this is not possible, unless the theory satisfies axioms 2 and 3.
In a similar spirit, in the presence of axioms 2 and 3, it is natural to expect that the decoherence process on a bipartite system is reducible to the decoherence of the two components. In diagrams:
for every ρ. However, using the most general definition of complete decoherence (definition 1) we cannot compare the action of D α ⊗ D β to the action of D αβ , as there is no specific recipe for decohering states. Let us see, instead, what happens when we consider MIDs. Let {a i } dA i=1 and {b j } dB j=1 be the measurements associated with α and β respectively; the measurement associated with αβ will be {a i ⊗ b j }. Therefore the MID D αβ is the channel
An easy rewriting shows that
which is one of the desiderata of [55] . This means that for MIDs the behavior on composite systems is fully reducible to the behavior on the components. Note that this result is even stronger than eq. (E1) in the absence of Local Tomography. This fact is another indication that the MID is the most physically-motivated form of decoherence, and that it gives rise to local classical theories by a local action on the systems involved.
